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Introduction
Bedouin Arabs in Israel are a Muslim society undergoing dramatic social change.
The Bedouin have lived in the Negev desert since the sixth century, having migrated
there from the Arabian Peninsula. In the course of the last five decades this
traditionally nomadic/semi-nomadic population has undergone rapid modernization
and urbanization, and today approximately 120,000 Bedouin Arabs live in the
Negev.' Traditionally herders and farmers, only about 5 per cent of the Negev
Bedouin are still semi-nomadic tent dwellers.2 Most families are sedentary, living in
sub-tribal groups in shacks and houses. The Negev Bedouin population has the
lowest socio-economic rating of all localities and social groups in Israeli society.3
Even as late as 1917, when Ottoman rule over the region was concluded at the
end of the First World War, modern medical services for the rural population were
rare and mostly inaccessible, except for infrequent and unscheduled visits by a
physician.4 Although the British made some limited attempts to introduce western
health care to the Negev Bedouin Arabs during the Mandate Period (1917-48), their
efforts were largely confined to preventive services and hygiene. However, by the
mid-1930s there was a small eight-bed hospital in Beer Sheva and four clinics in the
Negev region.5 None the less, these meagre services and personnel were totally
incapable ofproviding for the health needs ofthe Bedouin population, the majority
of whom still lived on the periphery of settlement in the country.6
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Following the establishment of an independent Israeli state in 1948, the Israeli
government saw fit to relate specifically and separately to the health needs of its
entire Arab population. For that purpose, a special Minorities Department was
established within the Ministry of Health. In the 1950s, however, the government
closed the department, claiming that the Arab community had by then merged into
the social structure of the general population. The new approach was to deal with
the Israeli Arab population in a manner consistent with long range planning for the
general population.7 But the situation of the Negev Bedouin Arabs was more
complicated than this approach allowed for. During the first two decades of Israeli
rule (1948-66), the Bedouin were governed by a military administration,8 which
significantly restricted the geographical mobility of this previously semi-nomadic
people, while providing only rudimentary local services, including health services.
The purpose of this study is to trace the development of Israel's official health
policy towards the Bedouin in the first two decades of statehood, from 1948, when
the Negev Bedouin lived under a newly established military government, until the
abolition ofmilitary rule in 1966. The study is based on archival material from the
period, including parliamentary protocols, annual reports of the State Comptroller,
articles, operational reports of Kupat Holim (the General Sick Fund), interviews
and governmental reports describing health policy vis-a-vis the Bedouin sector.
Health Services for the Bedouin of the Negev, 1948-1955
The establishment of the State of Israel in May 1948 prompted some of the
Bedouin tribes to migrate to Egypt and Jordan from the Negev, which had been
included in the Jewish state under the UN Partition Plan of29 November 1947. Out
of a total Bedouin population in the Negev of about 65,000 prior to 1948,
approximately 11,000 remained.9
Shortly after the outbreak ofthe War ofIndependence, the Israel Defence Forces
placed the Negev under military government,'0 requiring special permits for entry
'Israel Ministry of Health, Health services in
Israel, publication no. 163, Jerusalem,
Government of Israel Press, 1968.
8This abnormal state of affairs, imposition of
selective military government by a democratic
country, should be viewed in its historic context.
The 1948 War of Independence was an armed
conflict that began with six months of fierce civil
war between Palestinian Arabs and Jews prior to
invasion of the country in May 1948 by the
armies of the neighbouring Arab countries. It was
the culmination of the protracted rivalry between
the Arab and Jewish national liberation
movements, which was marked by sporadic
violence (1921, 1929, 1936-39) precipitated by
Arab resistance to Zionist aspirations.
Moreover, for most of the first decade of
military government (1948-56), Israel was
contending with social and economic upheaval
in the wake of war and mass immigration, and
the socio-economic and political instability was
exacerbated by the problem of the insecure
borders. This period was characterized not only
by widespread illicit smuggling but also by
frequent acts of sabotage and a series of
murderous attacks on Jewish civilian settlements
and public transport by infiltrators from across
the borders, particularly in the Negev. E Marx,
Bedouin of the Negev, Tel Aviv, Reshafim, 1974,
pp. 38-41.
9Marx notes 55,000 to 65,000 before 1948,
and about 11,000 in 1953. Marx, op. cit., note 8
above, p. 17, table 1, p. 18. Michael Hanegbi,
military governor of Beer Sheva, noted 13,000
Bedouin; Tuvyahu Archives, Hanegbi Files,
Ben Gurion University, Beer Sheva.
The number of Bedouin mentioned in the
Palestine Post on 16 Sept. 1949 was 38,000.
"The Arabs of Galilee, the Triangle region
and the Sharon were also placed under military
supervision. Cities with mixed Arab and Jewish
populations were not under military government.
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into or exit from specially designated areas. The issue ofpermits was the prerogative
of the military governor alone. While some Bedouin tribes remained on their land,
others were concentrated, through forced migration, in an area that constituted a
mere 10 per cent of the terrain in which they had previously enjoyed freedom of
movement. In addition, they lost crops and livestock at a time when throughout the
country there was a great shortage of food of all kinds. All this had a profoundly
detrimental effect on their nomadic lifestyle. As a consequence of these restrictions,
the Bedouin sheikhswere dependent on the military authorities and underthe control
ofthe military governor, who gave them responsibility for the distribution oftransit
permits and the registration of births, marriages and deaths within their tribes, for
which they were paid." Another result was the limitation of access to medical
assistance at the first aid clinic in Beer Sheva.'2
The pre-independence Jewish community had already established its own extensive
medicalcaresystemthroughoutcentralandnorthernPalestine,buttheNegevremained
an undeveloped hinterland where medical services were far less developed. In 1949, a
military hospital was opened in Beer Sheva under the auspices ofthe Israel Defence
Forces Medical Corps, but it was primarily designed to serve military government
personnel and treated only emergency cases among the Bedouin. Instead, makeshift
first aid clinics were established neareach ofthe fourmilitary government posts.
With the arrival ofIsraeli forces in the northern Negev, theprovisional government
of Israel, still engaged in a war for survival ofthe fledgling state, established a new
"Minorities Department" within the Ministry of Health, headed by Dr A Melchi.'3
Its creation was motivated by an "enlightened" policy aimed at providing medical
services, where they had not previously existed, for minority populations, including
all Israeli Arabs. During its first year of operation, the Minorities Department
provided first aid services to the Bedouin at the military government headquarters
in Beer Sheva. Concurrently, the Ministry ofHealth opened a regional office in Beer
Sheva, and the first medical service for the Bedouin community, Mobile Clinic No.1,
was inaugurated in March 1949.'4 The rather complicated arrangements required to
establish this modest service reflected the conditions prevailing in Israeli society at
the time. The War of Independence had just ended, and the flood of immigration
that doubled thepopulation ofthedrained andwar-torn young stateseverely strained
its financial and material resources. All goods, including food, clothing and petrol,
were strictly rationed.
Records ofthe Ministry ofHealth's Minorities Department reveal that it planned
to create four such mobile clinics in Israel, all operating out of ambulances, one of
which was to serve the Bedouin of the Negev. At the same time, the Jewish Society
for Humane Service continued to develop plans to expand its medical services to
" The registration of births, marriages and 3No data is available on Dr Melchi.
deaths was a paid service the sheikhs provided to 14Ambulance No. 2 served the Arab
their tribes. On the role of the sheikhs in the population in Galilee. It was financed entirely by
military government, see Marx, op. cit., note 8 the Ministry of Health. Israel State Archives
above, pp. 19-20, 38 44. (hereafter ISA), Minorities Department files, 118/
12 H Kozlovsky, 'The medical care of the 7, 16 Mar. 1949.
Negev Bedouin, 1949-1952', Tuvyahu Archives,
Kozlovsky Files.
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the Bedouin of the Negev. A permanent clinic was planned to provide preventive
medicine, social services for the needy and a "sick room" for "hospitalizing" and
treating special cases requiring close medical supervision. But the plans to establish
separate"sickrooms" weredroppedontherecommendation ofMelchi,whosuggested
that the Hadassah Medical Organization take responsibility for hospitalizations
within its Beer Sheva facility in order to prevent redundancy.'5 In practice, Hadassah
staffrefused to hospitalize Bedouin patients for more than two days, and even then
only in cases of dire emergency. Longer hospitalization required the transfer of
Bedouin patients to Tel Aviv.'6 Less urgent cases were sent directly to hospitals in
the centre of the country. Surgical cases were referred to the Beer Sheva hospital.
The first mission of the mobile clinic was to inoculate Bedouin children against
smallpox, and this project was completed in May 1949, despite logistical difficulties.
The Bedouin co-operated fully andthe inoculation campaign wascarried outwithout
opposition.'7 Dr Henry Kozlovsky, head ofMobile Clinic No. 1, did not specify the
percentage of children vaccinated in this campaign but, in his opinion, the main
problems of Bedouin children were malnutrition, eye diseases, infectious sores and
diarrhoea caused by poorhygiene. InAugust 1949, sixmonths afterthe inauguration
of the mobile clinic, the Magen David Adom (Israel first aid society)'8 informed
Kozlovsky that the ambulance was being transferred to Haifa.'9 The focus ofmedical
care for the Bedouin was then transferred to a clinic opened by the Ministry of
Health in November 1950, next to the Hadassah Hospital in Beer Sheva. Special
emphasis was placed on mother and child services provided by clinic nurses. All of
the four first aid clinics, which opened twice a week, were adjacent to the military
government offices. Kozlovsky was appointed district health officer by the Ministry
of Health and served as sole physician to the Bedouin community until 1955.
The high incidence oftuberculosis among Jewish immigrant populations arriving
in the early 1950s prompted the Ministry of Health to initiate a war on TB that
continued for a number ofyears. Its objectives were to locate carriers, inoculate the
population and eradicate the disease. In fact, necessity dictated that, due to the
higher incidence of tuberculosis among the Bedouin, efforts to X-ray all possible
carriers among them had to be even more thorough than those among the Jewish
population.20 The aim ofthe anti-TB campaign was not merely to protect the Jewish
population from the spread of the disease, it was part of a national policy for
improving the health ofthe entire population. Failure to combat tuberculosis among
the Bedouin could have rendered the campaign ineffective.
'5Letter from Dr A Melchi to Henry (equivalent of Red Cross), founded in 1930. In
Kozlovsky, 12 April 1949, ISA, Minorities Israel this is the only recognized first aid
Department files, 118/7. organization.
"Hadassah Medical Organization Report, '9Letter from Magen David Adom to the
'The Beer Sheva hospital 1949-1951', ISA Ministry of Health, 13 Feb. 1951, ISA, Minorities
Minorities Department files, 118/7. Department files, 118/.
1 The first report of Mobile Clinic No. 1 to 'Report about the minograph, a mobile
Israel Ministry of Health, 10 April 1949, ISA, roentgen machine used to screen for pulmonary
Minorities Department files, 118/. tuberculosis in the years 1954-59. ISA, Minorities
'8Magen David Adom (Hebrew for "Red Department files, 118/7.
Shield of David"), the Israel first aid society
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The Ministry's final report on the eradication of tuberculosis noted that the
inadequate living conditions of the Bedouin, tent encampments, poor nutrition and
lack of facilities for maintaining elementary hygiene, were the primary sources of
the disease. Twelve per cent of the Bedouin suffered from active tuberculosis, six
times the rate (2 per cent) prevalent in the Jewish community. With 30,000 Israeli
pounds allocated for this purpose, a huge sum at the time, the campaign, which
continued from 1951 to 1954, included mass chest X-rays ofthe Bedouin population
performed with a mobile X-ray unit. Those in need ofhospitalization were referred
to the Hadassah Hospital in Beer Sheva, or even to the government operated Assaf
Harofeh Hospital outside Tel Aviv.
Despite the campaign, difficulties were encountered in treating tuberculosis among
the Bedouin.2' According to a Ministry of Health report, the primary reason for
failure was that 30 per cent of the Bedouin failed to return for periodic check-ups
due to difficulties in obtaining travel permits from the military governor.22 Sixty per
cent refused to be hospitalized or left hospital without prior notice and disappeared,
abandoning treatment with the first improvement in theircondition, in contravention
of doctor's orders.
In general, there were a number ofreasons for neglect ofcurative care among the
Bedouin; budget constraints, the low priority assigned to Bedouin health services by
the young Israeli State, lack ofhealth legislation, and obstacles linked to the military
administration. All services for the Bedouin had to be established anew after 1948,
and in many areas, especially in the Negev, facilities available to Jews were also still
primitive in 1955. Hence, the state of Bedouin health services was not exceptional
in Israel at that time. It should be emphasized, however, that the problem of
providing health services to the Bedouin was exacerbated by the logistical difficulties
and great expense involved in reaching the highly dispersed population, whose own
ability to visit the urban health centres was restricted by the military governor.
The 1950s in Israel were marked by continuing and severe economic hardship.
The country was absorbing hundreds of thousands ofJews from surrounding Arab
countries and 100,000 Holocaust survivors from Europe. Israel had to cope, both
on an emotional and an economic level, with the loss of 1 per cent of the Jewish
population: 6,000 Jews fell in the War of Independence out of a population of
600,000. In addition, from 1950 to 1956, the government had to contend with armed
infiltrators and saboteurs on theperiphery, particularly in the Negev region, bordered
by Egypt on one side and Jordan on the other.
In 1951, development ofthe Negev was transferred to the Ministry ofAgriculture
and then, in 1952, to the Ministry of Finance. The 1951 annual report of the State
Comptroller pointed out that this transfer from ministry to ministry caused serious
delays and created obstacles in the development of the region and of the Bedouin
21 'A summary of the TB problem', Israel two thousand sick Bedouin', Harefua (Medicine,
Ministry of Health, Minorities Department, 1959, Israel Medical Association Journal), 1964, no. 12:
ISA, Minorities Department files, 118/. 450-3; M Mendes, 'La Tuberculose parmi les
22Ibid.; B J Ben Assa, 'TB among the Negev Arabs en Israel', Israel TB Convention Reports,
Bedouin', Beriut Hatzibur (Public Health), 1962, Jerusalem, IMD Press, 1959, p. 99.
no. 5, pp. 333-7, p. 335; idem, 'Vital statistics of
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communityinparticular.23 However, between 1950 and 1954, noquestionsconcerning
the health, educational or economic needs of the Bedouin were raised or discussed
in the Knesset. Nor was the issue even mentioned in debates on Negev land
registration, although most of the land under consideration lay within the area
historically traversed by the Bedouin, or was owned by them outright.24
It was not only the Bedouin of the Negev that suffered discrimination as a result
of geographic isolation. The lack of adequate hospital facilities for the Jewish
population in the area also directly affected the Bedouin because ofthe demand on
existing resources that were in short supply.25 The problem could have been solved
bylegislation for anational health insurance system. This, however, did nottranspire.
In the period under study, public health services in Israelencompassed onlyvoluntary
health insurance, through non-profit making public sick funds similar to Kupat
Holim,whosecontributorswerealmostexclusivelymembersoftheJewishcommunity.
For the Bedouin, insurance in general and medical insurance in particular were
concepts totally foreign to their culture. Moreover, the majority were too poor to
provide themselves with medical insurance on a voluntary basis, and in any case
most were totally unaware that such an option existed.26 Bedouin at that time were
rarely wage labourers, with the limited exception ofseasonal labour in citrus groves,
work that could be obtained only with a permit. Health insurance contributions
were directly linked to membership ofa labour union and involved regular monthly
payments by both employer and employee. Thus, an insurmountable financial
obstacle to Bedouin participation in the Kupat Holim health insurance scheme
existed, side by side with the enormous cultural barrier.27
The first significant change in the provision of health services to the Bedouin
based on the principle of egalitarian treatment came only with the passing of the
Maternal Insurance Law of 1953 and establishment of the National Insurance
Institute, which manages Israel's social security system.
The Activity of the National Insurance Institute and Maternal Insurance in the
Bedouin Sector
At the end of 1953, the Knesset passed the Maternal Insurance Law, which
stipulated that all new mothers were entitled to a maternity allowance, part ofwhich
23'The report of the Israeli State
Comptroller for the budgetary year 1951-1952',
Report No. 3, 31 Dec. 1952, Jerusalem,
Government of Israel Press, p. 48, Knesset
Archives. The Israeli State Comptroller is
appointed by the government to examine
methods of administration, and income and
expenditure accounts of government offices.
The Comptroller publishes an annual report
and enjoys independent status and full
professional autonomy.
24 The Israeli State Comptroller's Report No.
3, 1951-52; Report No. 4, 1952-53; Report No.
5, 1953-54, Jerusalem, Government of Israel
Press, Knesset Archives.
25S Shvarts, 'The political conflict about the
establishment of a central hospital in the Negev',
Eyunim, 1995, 5 (5): 388-412.
26Reiss, op. cit. note 4 above.
27Prof Haim Doron, interview, Ramat Gan,
28 Mar. 2001. Doron was a family physician in
Kupat Holim Clalit in Beer Sheva from 1953 to
1961; from 1961 to 1968 he was the medical
director of the Negev Region of Kupat Holim
Clalit. See also Moshe Soroka files, IV-104-32a,
Labor Archives-Lavon Institute, Tel Aviv. Kupat
Holim, the General Sick Fund, was the major
public health provider in Israel; Histadruth, the
Federation of Labour, was the "Mother"
organization of Kupat Holim.
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was to be paid to the hospital to cover delivery costs, and part given to the mother,
in goods or in cash, to provide the newborn with basic necessities. Implementation
ofthe lawwas entrusted to the newly established National Insurance Institute. Under
this law, public hospitals received payment from the Institute in lieu of billing the
mother. The Ministry of Health set a standard fee for deliveries in public hospitals
and negotiated payments to other non-public facilities. The balance ofthe maternity
grant was given directly to the mother upon her discharge from the hospital.
The legislation had a far-reaching effect on Bedouin women. Until that time, most
had given birth at home in their encampments with the aid of a tribal midwife, and
infant mortality was extremely high. Children were not inoculated and new mothers
did not receive instruction on modern care of their infants. Not only were hospital
deliveries beyond the means ofBedouin women, they were totally foreign to Bedouin
tradition. Now free hospitalization and above all a cash grant served as powerful
incentives. Bedouin women opted to go to hospital, not so much out of faith in
western medical practices as to become eligible for the cash "reward" upon their
release from the hospital.28
The number ofBedouin women opting for hospitalization increased, but the 100-
bed hospital in Beer Sheva faced increasing difficulties and the number of Bedouin
women admitted was limited. The opening ofthe Central Hospital for the Negev in
1960 alleviated the shortage of hospital beds and the number of Bedouin women
admitted to the hospital rose considerably. In 1954, only 5 per cent of all women in
the Arab sector gave birth in the hospital; by 1960 that number had risen to 54 per
cent and was about 2 out of 3 by 1972-73.29 Infant mortality dropped from 61
deaths per thousand births to 31 in 1972-73,30 but it was still double the death rate
in the Jewish community in the same year (16.8 per thousand births).3'
As well as encouraging hospital deliveries, the Ministry ofHealth operated mother
and child clinics ("Tipat Halav"), staffed by a nurse and open twice a week. These
clinics provided instruction to new mothers on how to care for their infants, together
with well baby care (weighing and periodic examination), immunizations and milk
if needed.
28Prof. Eliyahu Lehman, director of the
Hadassah Hospital in Beer Sheva (1950-60)
stated that the social security grant was the prime
incentive for Bedouin women using the hospital
services for deliveries in the 1950s. Interview,
April 2001. Dr Jean Fichmann, a paediatrician,
who worked among the Bedouin for twenty-five
years, and Dr Viola Turek, the medical director
of the Negev Region (1960-88) listed two
important reasons why the Bedouin used the
hospital for deliveries: first, the social security
grant; second, the opportunity to get some rest
and "some pampering" during hospitalization
(4-5 days). They both noted that after only a
couple of years the "medical benefits" ofwestern
medicine became a major incentive together with
the social security grant and the rest. Interview,
April 2001. See also Tal, op. cit., note 6 above,
p. 174.
29G A Lewando-Hundt, 'Patterns of
utilization of health services among Negev
Bedouin Arabs', working paper, Sede Boker
College of Ben Gurion University of the Negev,
1988, pp. 2-35, p. 26; Israel Central Bureau of
Statistics, Statistical Abstract ofIsrael, 1955,
1960, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1977, Jerusalem,
Government of Israel Press.
3' Lewando-Hundt (op. cit., note 29 above)
noted that, with a problem ofunder-recording,
the actual number of deaths per thousand was
between 50 and 100; Israel Central Bureau of
Statistics noted 45 deaths per thousand in 1965.
Israel Central Bureau ofStatistics, Jerusalem,
Government of Israel Press, 1965.
3 Lewando-Hundt, op. cit., note 29 above,
p. 26.
53Shifra Shvarts, Jefrey Borkan, Mohamad Morad, Michael Sherf
In addition to the Maternal Insurance Law, which promoted the economic
advancement ofBedouinwomen, theNational Insurance Lawgranted amonthlycash
supplement to large low-income families. Moreover, the child allowances-monthly
govemment stipends paid to all parents for each child in the family under the age
of eighteen-also contributed to improving the living standards of the Bedouin.
Over the years, the child allowance became a significant source of income for some
Bedouin families.32 Moreover, eligibility for such a benefit encouraged the Bedouin
to register newborn children on theiridentitycards, in thehospital afterthedelivery.33
Health Services for the Bedouin of the Negev, 1955-1959
In April 1955, the Ministry of Health initiated a separate medical service for the
Bedouin in Beer Sheva, headed by a full-time physician, Dr Benyamin Ben Assa,34
who was assisted by a trained nurse. Curative services, together with mother and
child services and consultations in preventive medicine were provided in a clinic
adjacent to the Bedouin market, on the outskirts ofBeer Sheva. The Bedouinmedical
service was also responsible for inoculation and medical supervision in outlying
areas. The Bedouin were permitted by the military governor to visit Beer Sheva once
a week, on market day, and on that day they sought medical assistance at the clinic,
a situation that resulted in long queues and lengthy waits. It became clear that the
system needed reorganization and expansion, and that this reform required both
additional funding and political support.
On 3 November 1955, Israel Barzilai, a member of the Mapam party, replaced
YosefSerlin as Minister ofHealth. Mapam, a left-wing socialist party with a history
ofideology-based activism in the Arab sector, viewed improvement ofhealth services
among the Bedouin as a prime objective. On 26 November 1956, Barzilai addressed
the Knesset on the health services in the country as a whole, devoting special
attention to the problems of health services among the Negev Bedouin. It was the
first time that Bedouin health care had been discussed on the floor of the Knesset.
Barzilai cited his Ministry's activities in promoting the health ofthe Negev Bedouin:
the opening of general clinics and the mother and child stations that provided
instruction for mothers. He stressed the budgetary constraints and logistic problems
associated with expansion of these services.
In the ensuing debate, another member of Knesset, Dr Moshe Sneh (Communist)
accused the government of deliberately neglecting minority groups. To underscore
his point, he cited infant mortality rates among the Bedouin, which were double
those among Jews. In arebuttal, the previous Minister ofHealth, YosefSerlin, argued
32S E Beckerleg, G A Lewando-Hundt, 3 Benyamin Ben Assa (1916-76) was born in
J M Borkan, K J Abu Saad, I Belmaker, Holland and came to Israel in 1950. He replaced
'Eliciting local voices using natural focus groups', Henry Kozlovsky as head of the medical service
Anthropology and Medicine, 1997, 4 (3): 273-88; for the Bedouin in the Negev, a post he held till
A Meir, As nomadism ends: the Israeli Bedouin of 1965. After that he offered his private medical
the Negev, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1997, service to the Bedouin in his clinic in Beer Sheva.
p. 137. Ben Assa was awarded the Albert Schweitzer
33The Knesset Archives, 16 Jan. 1956, Prize for his work.
pp. 288-95, and 14 Nov. 1956, pp. 261-2.
54The Health Care ofthe Negev Bedouin, 1948-1966
that there was no intentional neglect ofminorities, rather, the problem stemmed from
lack ofa comprehensive health policy. The debate focused on the financing ofhealth
services, on the political issue of national health insurance legislation, and on the
competition betweenprivate hospitals and Ministry ofHealth hospitals.35
Despite the lack of a comprehensive health policy, Barzilai used his position to
strive for improvements in minority health services. The primary obstacle was a lack
oftrained staffto fill positions in the Arab sector.36 The problem offinding additional
physicians to work in Bedouin clinics led Ben Assa to request a transfer from Beer
Sheva to Jerusalem, arguing that it was impossible to treat a population of 15,000
Bedouin single-handed. Only the entreaties of the Bedouin sheikhs and promises
from the Ministry of Health to find an additional physician persuaded Ben Assa to
remain at his post.37 However, the Ministry failed to find a doctor to reduce the
burden on him, and the situation deteriorated further.
In December 1958, Barzilai, as Minister of Health, opened a new clinic for the
Bedouin in Beer Sheva. At the same time, the Ministry made an arrangement with
the military government that allowed Bedouin who lacked the means to pay for
treatment to be admitted to public hospitals.38 The Ministry guaranteed it would
cover the hospitalization costs.
Hospitalization, particularly oftuberculosis patients, had been a chronic problem
since 1948. Because most Bedouin patients were not members of sick funds, the
majority were unable to pay for treatment, but Kupat Holim and government
hospitals refused to admit them free of charge. The arrangement for free hospital
care was, however, oflimited value: it did not cover X-rays or expensive medication.
Thus, Bedouin were hospitalized but did not undergo all the testing and treatment
available. In December 1958, Mapam voiced opposition to the military governor's
practice of intervening in decisions on whether hospitalization was necessary and
how much the patient should be required to pay, arguing that the governor was not
an objective party and the Ministry ofHealth should set clearcriteria and procedures
providing equal access to hospitals for all citizens.39
Bedouin patients and theirfamilies also complained of"sanctions" by Beer Sheva's
Hadassah Hospital's secretary, who would not allow the treatment of Bedouin for
whom payment had not been arranged.' In general, the Ministry ofHealth and the
military government tried to protect the Bedouin, not always with success. Ministry
reports cited only one hospital, AssafHarofeh, for its particularly positive attitudes
toward Bedouin patients.41 The number of Bedouin hospitalized nationwide each
35The Knesset Archives, 26 Nov. 1956, 1960, ISA, Minorities Department files, 118/7,
pp. 315-26. and letter from A Paul, the district physician, to
36Reiss, op. cit., note 4 above, pp. 80-1, and B Ben Assa, 21 Feb. 1961, ISA, Minorities
the Knesset Archives, 20 Nov. 1956, p. 293. Department files, 118/7.
37 M Arzieli, '15000 Bedouins without a 4' Letter from Malcha Freedman, Deputy of
physician', Ha'aretz, 20 Mar. 1958, p. 12. District Department of the Ministry of Health in
38 M Arzieli, 'New clinic for Bedouins in the Beer Sheva, to the Curative Care Department of
Negev', Ha'aretz, 20 May 1958, p. 11. the Ministry of Health in Jerusalem, 18 May
"The Knesset Archives, 24 Dec. 1958, 1960, ISA, Minorities Department files, 118/.
pp. 654-5, and 26 June 1956, p. 2115.
4 Report No. 17 of the Medical Service for
Bedouins in the Negev, 1 Sept. 1959 to 1 Jan.
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month averaged between 26 and 42, the overwhelming majority of them in Beer
Sheva's Hadassah Hospital.42
The problem of hospitalization of Bedouin patients was significantly alleviated
with the opening of the Central Hospital for the Negev in Beer Sheva in 1960, a
facility built, owned and operated by Kupat Holim. Before it was opened, an
agreement was reached between the Minister ofHealth, Barzilai, and Moshe Soroka,
the administrative director of Kupat Holim, whereby, in return for permission to
build the Central Hospital, all Bedouin would be admitted irrespective of means.43
This agreement marked the first serious attempt by a minister of health to solve,
at an institutional level, the problem of providing the Bedouin with hospital care
near to their homes. In a letter to the Beer Sheva district physician, the head of
medical services in the Ministry ofHealth, Dr Bernard Cohen, wrote, "In the future,
Bedouin will be hospitalized only in Beer Sheva. They will be sent to government
hospitals in the North [AssafHarofe] only ifthere is no suitable department to treat
them in the Beer Sheva hospital.""
Mobilizing nursing and administrative personnel to operate the Bedouin clinics
was also a problem. It was hard to find a suitable nurse, since the post required
fluency in Arabic and outstanding organizational skills. In addition to operating the
clinic in Beer Sheva, the nurse was also responsible for supervising the four local
clinics in the area undermilitary government and forinstructing the Bedouin medical
orderlies who worked as auxiliary personnel in the clinics. Moreover, thejob called
forsensitivity to Bedouintraditions andcultureindealingswithpatients. InDecember
1959, the chief nurse in the Beer Sheva clinic was dismissed for inappropriate
behaviour and insensitivity toward Bedouin patients. During the same period, a
report by the Minorities Department of the Ministry of Health noted that the
minorities' officer and two clerks had been relieved of their duties on the same
grounds. It was difficult to find suitable candidates to replace them.
To solve the shortage of personnel, Ben Assa began training Bedouin as medical
orderlies and practical male nurses.45 In April 1960, the first Bedouin practical male
nurse was qualified after completing a two-year course. The male nurses were
integrated into the clinics, serving as auxiliary staff to the registered nurse.
The Bedouin Medical Services, 1960-1966
Between 1957 and 1960, the Negev suffered from anextended drought that severely
affected the Bedouin living under military government. Camels and sheep were left
without pasture. The media reported hunger among Bedouin tribes and the subject
was raised in the Knesset, although the Ministry of Health claimed that there was
no genuine famine, but rather a temporary state of distress."6 In an extraordinary
42Report No. 17, op. cit., note 40 above. " "Practical nurses" are not registered and
43As a condition for the establishment of the receive a shorter training than registered nurses.
central hospital in the Negev, I Barzilai, the In the past, in many peripheral areas, practical
Minister of Health, specified that it must provide nurses took the place of registered nurses when
medical services to soldiers. no registered nurse was available.
" Letter from Dr B Cohen to the district " M Arzieli, 'No hunger among Bedouins',
physician in Beer Sheva, 27 Mar. 1960, ISA, Ha'aretz, 24 Mar. 1960, p. 7.
Minorities Department files, 118/7.
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measure, the Israeli government allowed the Bedouin to migrate northward, beyond
the jurisdiction of the military.
The depletion of herds had a harsh effect on the economic circumstances and
health ofthe Bedouin. Among infants and children, numerous cases ofmalnutrition
were seen. Under normal circumstances, Bedouin children were nursed for an
extended period, as long as their mothers had milk.47 Changes in nutrition among
the mothers, as a result ofthe drought, adversely affected the health ofthe children,
and the number of cases of malnutrition-induced anaemia grew, leading to the
hospitalization of large numbers of infants in the Central Hospital of the Negev in
Beer Sheva.48 To alleviate the plight of the Bedouin, the Ministries of Health and
Welfare provided families with monthly stipends ofup to 60 Israeli pounds a month.
At the same time, the Ministry of Education budgeted for milk distribution to
Bedouin children within the public school system; over a period oftwo months some
550 containers of bottled milk (2775 cups) were distributed to schoolchildren. The
campaign was well received; schools reported 100 per cent attendance throughout
the two-month period.49 The Bedouin also received dry goods, flour, rice, powdered
milk, eggs and oil, and those suffering from tuberculosis received an enriched ration.
The special distribution programme was scheduled to last six months. However,
the continuation of the drought and the increase in the number of malnourished
Bedouin led to a worrying rise in the incidence of tuberculosis to a rate four times
higher than that among the Jewish population. The Ministry of Health was obliged
to renew its campaign against the disease.50 Mantoux tests were conducted en masse,
and children were vaccinated. In June 1960, Ben Assa called an emergency meeting
at the regional office of the Ministry of Health in Beer Sheva and warned that he
could not keep the outbreak oftuberculosis under control. A committee was formed
to prepare a suitable response.5' The programme adopted called for vaccination of
17,000 Bedouin, with the assistance ofauxiliary nursing staff and in the presence of
outside observers. Also, in order to protect the population of Beer Sheva from
47Breast-feeding lasted for eighteen months
for a boy and a year for a girl. This was very
flexible and weaning often occurred in the spring.
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possible infection, the Ministry ofHealth decided tovaccinate all Beer Shevaresidents
under the age of thirty who had not previously been vaccinated, in the hope that
this would stop the spread ofthe disease and reduce its incidence among the Bedouin.
Budgetary constraints facing the Ministry in its activities among the Bedouin were
not limited solely to the tuberculosis campaign. Those Bedouin whom the military
governorjudged able to contribute to the cost ofhospitalization paid only a pre-set
fee, irrespective ofthe number ofdays spent in the hospital or the nature ofthe care
they received. On the other hand, the entire hospital bill for indigent Bedouin was
covered by the Ministry of Health. Since most Bedouin were categorized as unable
to pay, they were often in no hurry to leave hospital. Kupat Holim, assured of
payment under any circumstances, was liberal in admitting patients and lax in
discharging them. This policy subsequently led to extremely high expenditure.
To address the problem of resources wasted on unjustified hospital stays,
Dr A Paul, acting deputy director of the Ministry of Health's Beer Sheva regional
office,52 demanded that Bedouin with means to do so should pay according to the
length of their stay in hospital, rather than a fixed fee, thus providing an incentive
for them to leave the hospital on time. In addition, the military governor asked Ben
Assa to examine the financial standing of each Bedouin seeking hospitalization in
order to limit the number of unnecessary admissions of those who were destitute.53
Only in 1964, however, after three years ofdeliberation, did the Ministry agree that
DrAmosArnan, thepermanentdistrictphysicianfortheNegev,54 shouldbepermitted
to gather evidence about the finances of each family within the domain of the
military government. Arnan would decide before and not after hospitalization
whether a patient could pay. Kupat Holimdid not involve itselfin these deliberations
at all, since full coverage of the hospitalization costs of Bedouin in its Beer Sheva
facility was already assured.55
While questions ofbudget and funding were solved through administrative reform,
without any detrimental impact on the quality of medical services to the Bedouin,
the problem of recruitment ofnursing and medical personnel was far more difficult
to overcome. Shortage of trained staffwas a major impediment to the development
of services.
In March 1961, Dr Y Cohen, head of medical services in the Ministry of Health,
requested the assistance ofthe Jewish Agency (the veteran NGO associated with the
World Zionist Organisation that engages in immigration and Jewish settlement
activity) in locating an immigrant physician to work with the Bedouin. He made it
clear that the Ministry would cover the cost of training. At the same time, the
Ministry of Health sent a similar message to the Association of Dutch Immigrants
52A Paul from Rehovot in Israel replaced 53 Letter from Paul to the Director of
A Arnan, the district physician, for a short Peripheral Services, 19 June 1961, ISA, Minorities
period while the latter was in the United Department Files, 118/7.
States. According to Dr Turek, later the district 54Amos Aman was the district physician in
physician, Paul was unrealistic in his Beer Sheva during 1957-67.
expectations, and when Arnan came back the 5 Correspondence between the Ministry of
situation improved. Paul's plans, he said, Health in Jerusalem and B Ben Assa, Mar. 1961
were detrimental to the Bedouin medical to Oct. 1964, ISA, Minorities Department, 118/7.
service.
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in Israel, requesting their help in finding a Jewish doctor in the Netherlands who
would be prepared to fill the post. It is worth noting that Ben Assa was of Dutch
extraction and his work with the Bedouin was well known among the Dutch Jewish
community. TherewasasecondDutch-bornphysicianinBeerSheva, thepaediatrician
Dr Wilhelmina Cohen. Dr Jean Fischmann,56 who had worked in the Hadassah
Hospital in Beer Sheva, accepted the position and began work in the Ministry's
medical service for the Bedouin at the end of 1961. She undertook responsibility for
motherandchildcare, healtheducation andpreventivemedicalservices(vaccinations,
etc.)
The issue of the status of medical services for the Bedouin surfaced in its full
intensity in June 1961, when Paul ordered Ben Assa to remove signs with the
wording, "The Bedouin Medical Service", from the Beer Sheva and Umm Betin
clinics, claiming that legally there was no such entity as the "Bedouin Medical
Service".57 Ben Assa complied, but appealed against the directive, stating, first, that
it was illogical to claim there was no such official service, when in practice the service
had operated for six consecutive years; second, that it was incorrect to define the
buildings as "clinics", because they provided services other than medical services:
arranging hospitalization, organizing special campaigns such as milk distribution to
schools, the war on tuberculosis, the training of Bedouin medical orderlies, and so
forth; third, that since the Ministry ofHealth was making efforts to expand services
with its mother and child clinics, additional physicians, and so forth, there was no
sense in claiming such a service did not legally exist.58
Paul rejected the appeal, insisting that the service be defined as operating under
the auspices ofthe regional office. He claimed that Ben Assa was trying to set up a
separate service in defiance ofthe decisions of the Government of Israel. According
to Paul, Ben Assa had circumvented Paul's authority whenever possible and en-
deavoured to change the status quo by undermining the supervisory role ofhis office
and attempting to free himself from dependence on the district physician.59
The controversy over the status of the medical service for the Bedouin was
exacerbated bytheinitiative ofthe Minister ofAgriculture, Moshe Dayan, promoting
permanent settlement of the Bedouin. Dayan claimed that such a move would
alleviate theireconomic plight, which hadworsened due to thedrought. Themajority
of the Bedouin rejected this suggestion, fearing it would accelerate government
seizure of their lands. Ben Assa's support of their position further undermined the
physician's relationship with the Ministry of Health. In a letter to the Minister of
Health, Ben Assa wrote: "I must point out that the Bedouin are residents of the
southern district under the supervision of the military government. They have
problems in agriculture, water management, work, medicine, security and more.
56Jean Fischmann was born in England, and 5 Ibid.
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Since when do the Bedouin and their problems belong solely to the Ministry of
Agriculture? It would be highly desirable to establish a high level committee of
experts that can deal seriously with these problems with the active and ongoing co-
operation of the Bedouin themselves. Up until now, no one has asked them what
they want. I hope the Minister will want to initiate the establishment ofa committee
of this nature"." There was no response to this letter, no committee was formed,
and no one asked the Bedouin whether they wanted permanent settlement.
But the growing needs ofthe Bedouin could not be ignored. In 1961 the Ministry
of Health launched plans to expand services, with more clinics to be established
within the area of military administration. It was decided, however, not to build
new clinics, but to expand existing ones, until the government decided where
permanent settlements for the Bedouin would be located. At the same time, the
Prime Minister, Levi Eshkol, ordered the transfer ofall Bedouin affairs to his office
in ordertocentralize andco-ordinate treatment, and overcome the lackofintegration
that had characterized services in the past. The primary motive behind the con-
centration ofBedouin affairs in the Prime Minister's office was the formulation ofa
unifiedpolicy thatwouldfacilitateimplementation ofplansforpermanent settlement.
Health issues were addressed only in the context of arrangements for settlement.6'
Accordingtoamemorandumon'DevelopmentofmedicalservicesfortheBedouin',
prepared by the southern district of the Ministry of Health in 1961, the plan was
designed for 20,000 Bedouin. The introduction stressed, first, that it was impossible
to raise the health standards ofthe Bedouin as long as they remained scattered over
a wide geographic area in transitory tent encampments affording insufficient shelter,
lacking potable water, and adequate education facilities. Second, it was imperative
to settle the Bedouin in solid stone structures in villages or cities in one or several
locations and to integrate them into the economy ofthe country as farmers, unskilled
labourers or skilled craftsman. Third, a professional, inter-ministerial committee
should be established to examine the alternatives, together with experts and people
familiar with Bedouin life, including the Bedouin themselves, and to formulate plans
for implementation of these recommendations.
The document stressed that anyone who had spent a number ofyears working in
close proximity with the Bedouin must be aware ofthe government's lack ofplanning
in every aspect of these people's lives.62 The Ministry of Health was of the same
opinion as the Ministry of Agriculture with regard to permanent settlement of the
Bedouin, believing it to be a prerequisite for improving their standard ofhealth, but
no one had consulted the Bedouin themselves. This memorandum was the first to
attempt to formulate a coherent government health policy.
60Letter from B Ben Assa to the Minister of 62Memorandum from the District Department
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The programme's guidelines called for:
1. Doubling the nursing and medical staffwithin the framework ofexisting clinics;
2. Introducing social workers into welfare services for Bedouin;
3. Expanding mother and child care clinics;
4. Posting a paediatrician at mother and child care stations;
5. Establishing service desks within the domain of the military government;
6. Operating an ambulance to provide medical assistance;
7. Setting up a doctor-nurse team responsible for fighting tuberculosis, including
the location of active cases, transporting patients for hospitalization and
continuous observation of families exposed to the disease.
In the long term, the plan called for four physicians, seven nurses, three clerks, one
laboratory technician, one social worker, and three manned ambulances, all for a
population of20,000 people. The obstacles to the realization ofthe programme were
the lack ofabudget, a timetable, and ofadjustments for natural population growth.
In 1961, when the memorandum was composed, there were 17,000 Bedouin; by
1964, when the plan was implemented in part, their number had risen to 20,000
(almost double the 1948 figure of 11,000). As a result, there was a growing gap
betweentheslowlydevelopinghealthservicesandthegrowingneedsofthepopulation,
resulting from the rapid natural growth rate of the Bedouin community.
Kupat Holim and Health Services for the Bedouin in the Negev
In December 1961, Kupat Holim began providing ambulatory health services to
the Bedouin of the Negev. At that time, Kupat Holim, the primary health fund in
the country, provided health services to 80 per cent of Israel's inhabitants. Medical
coverage through membership of the organization was contingent on membership
ofthe LabourFederation, thefounderand ownerofKupatHolim, whichalsogranted
protection ofemployees' rights, pensions, annualvacations, workers' compensation in
cases ofwork-related accidents, maintenance of agreed working conditions, and an
overview of salary agreements.
In the 1950s, Kupat Holim focused its operation on the Jewish community,
including the extension of health services to new immigrants. In these years, the
health organization fought tomaintain its autonomous status as a Labour Federation
controlled institution, fiercely opposing attempts by the Minister of Health, Yosef
Serlin, and the Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, to nationalize the health services.
In the early fifties, the Fund operated in Beer Sheva and was the only health
provider offering ambulatory services to Jews living in Beer Sheva and outlying
Jewish agricultural settlements throughout the Negev, mostly populated by new
immigrants. The opening of the Central Hospital for the Negev in Beer Sheva in
1960 and the agreement with the Ministry of Health on the hospitalization of
Bedouin enhanced Kupat Holim's status in the Negev and prompted it to open its
membership to the Bedouin sector.
From a political standpoint, Kupat Holim viewed extensive penetration of the
"market" with services for the Bedouin as a means ofenhancing the organization's
power and hegemony as Israel's leading health service provider. A similar position
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was adopted by the Labour Federation, whose leaders viewed as a positive de-
velopment the increase in Federation membership through admission of hundreds
of Bedouin. In December 1961, Kupat Holim opened a clinic for Bedouin in Beer
Sheva. By December 1963 there were already485 Bedouin members ofKupat Holim,
among them Sheikh Hammad Abu Rabia, the richest of the Bedouin sheikhs. At
the beginning of 1964, there were 600 members, and the Fund was providing health
services to 2,000 Bedouin and their families. Shortly after opening its first clinic for
Bedouin in Beer Sheva, Kupat Holim decided to establish a clinic in Umm Betin as
well, adjacentto the Ministry's Bedouinmedical servicesclinic. Ben Assawasopposed
to this move, arguing that two separate and competitive systems were wasteful and
redundant. In his view, maintenance of two systems was the worst of all options.63
Ben Assa's comments prompted the director general of the Ministry of Health to
suggest to Kupat Holim that they collaborate on the opening of the Fund's clinic
for Bedouin. In December 1964, the two bodies agreed that Kupat Holim would
not open clinics without co-ordinating plans with the Ministry, and that, in locations
whereclinicswereoperatedbytheorganization, itwouldprovideservices touninsured
Bedouin, with payment assured by the Ministry.f' This agreement opened the door
for unlimited expansion ofhealth services to the Bedouin. Concurrently, outpatient
clinics at the Central Hospital of the Negev were opened to Bedouin patients in
need of specialists.
As the Bedouin settled in permanent locations and military rule drew to a close,
the Fund intensified and broadened its activity in the Bedouin sector. By 1966, when
the military government was abolished and the first Bedouin town was built, the
Fund was the only health organization providing health services to the Bedouin in
the Negev. In 1972, the Ministry of Health reached an arrangement with Kupat
Holim whereby the Ministry's health service clinics were incorporated into the
framework of the Fund's clinics. The Ministry continued to operate mother and
child stations. Thus, within the Bedouin community, curative medicine was placed
entirely in the hands of Kupat Holim. This situation prevailed until 1995, when
Israel passed a National Health Insurance Law, and competition for membership
led the other three sick funds to open clinics in the Bedouin sector as well.
Bedouin Medical Services in 1966, at the Close of Two Decades of
Military Government
In 1964 the level of medical services for the Bedouin in the Negev deteriorated.
Dr Ben Assa, who had been director ofhealth services and physician to the Bedouin
since 1955, resigned. A series of temporary appointments followed, until curative
care was transferred to Kupat Holim in 1972. All the other functions that Ben Assa
had performed for the Bedouin were closed down, including an advisory service on
63Letter from B Ben Assa to A Arnan, Peripheral Services concerning the contracts
9 Jan. 1964, ISA, Minorities Department files, signed by him and Stephan Graik of the central
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contact with the outside world, the formulation of a local health policy targetting
thespecialhealthneedsofthe Bedouincommunity, healtheducation andinformation,
academic research, and co-ordination with the military government.
The resignation of the physician who had been "the Bedouin's champion" in the
health system, faithfully guarding their best interests, had a detrimental effect on
the Bedouin. Some 20,000 people living in encampments were left without health
services. "The four clinics that were opened with much pomp and ceremony stand
closed, gathering dust", wrote the newspaper Ha'aretz. Criticism mounted, par-
ticularly after publication of press reports of the dispatch of Israeli physicians and
medical supplies to countries in distress in Africa. Sheikh Hammad Abu Rabia
commented, "Israel sends doctors to Africa and we, the loyal citizens of the State
don't have even one doctor".65
In an interview with Ha'aretz, Ben Assa declared that not only the Ministry of
Health was to blame, but the medical community as well, because doctors were
unwilling to work in the Negev. When four public tenders were published by the
Fund, only one doctor applied. Ben Assa stressed that the problem of attracting
medical staff was common to the Negev as a region, not specific to the Bedouin as
a minority.66
During the recession that struck the Israeli economy in the sixties, leading to an
unemployment rate of 10 per cent in early 1967, the avoidance of the Negev by
physicians in 1965 and 1966 was particularly marked. The recession prompted many
Israelis, including physicians, to seek employment abroad, but the posts offered in
the Negev remained unfilled.
The political climate in the sixties was not particularly encouraging for the future
of Bedouin health care. From 1961 to 1966, the Interior, Health and Welfare
ministries were all headed by ministers who were members ofthe National Religious
Party (NRP). Compared with the fifties, and despite the deep economic recession,
the government enjoyed relative stability during this period, based primarily on the
presence of the NRP in the coalition (which at that time leaned heavily toward
socialist-labour values and a welfare state economy). Partisan considerations led
NRP ministers to focus their attention on Jewish urban religious communities,
neglecting the Arab sector. None exhibited interest in improving health services for
the Bedouin. Ministry of Health reports for 1965-66 claimed that the Ministry of
Welfare had failed to provide welfare and social work services for the Bedouin and
that the Ministry ofthe Interior had failed to complete the registration ofall Bedouin
entitled to National Insurance benefits. According to one report, the percentage of
Bedouin receiving benefits was extremely low, with many totally unaware of the
benefits due to them from the Institute. Objectively speaking, the Bedouin, a low
income group burdened by poor health and limitations on personal freedom, clearly
deserved special attention in matters ofhealth, education and welfare, but what they
received was, in fact, less than adequate.
65 M Arzieli, 'The Bedouin were left without 66 M Arzieli, 'Dr Ben Assa, a man with
doctor', Ha'aretz, 14 May 1965, p. 16. principles', Ha'aretz, 14 Mar. 1965, p. 12.
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In September 1965, in the shadow of the recession, an inter-ministerial committee
was appointed to carry out a plan to settle the Bedouin permanently at three
locations. Theimpetusforpermanent settlementderivedfromsecurityconsiderations,
mainly the preservation of government control of public lands in the Negev.
Representatives of the ministries of health and education were not asked to serve
on the committee. The State Comptroller noted in his annual report that the Bedouin
had not been invited to participate in the decision-making either. Development plans
for the three settlement areas were completed in March 1966 and by the end of the
year water supply pipes had been laid and access roads built. Parallel with the
permanent settlement programme, the Israel Lands Authority inaugurated a pro-
gramme for leasing land for grazing and agricultural cultivation to Bedouin. This
unilateral step, taken without consulting the Bedouin themselves, prompted heated
debate inthe Knesset, initiatedbyparliamentary queriesfromArabKnessetmembers.
At this time, there were no Bedouin members ofparliament.
The final days ofmilitary government were characterized by rising tension between
the Bedouin and the government of Israel. Bedouin hostility stemmed from plans
for permanent settlement, fear ofseizure oflands bythe government, thepaternalistic
behaviour of the Israel Lands Authority regarding land use, and the failure of
education and health services.
Until military rule was abolished in late 1966, the State Comptroller did not
scrutinize the performance of the medical service for the Bedouin in his annual
report, except indirectly as part of the Ministry of Health Minorities Department.
With the end of military control, the medical service for the Bedouin was classified
as a separate subject for examination. This was a significant change. Throughout
the era of military government, data gathered within the Bedouin community were
included with data for the Arab sector in general, making it difficult to evaluate the
true state of affairs of the Negev Bedouin. In fact, at times the situation within the
Arab sector as a whole was diametrically different to that prevailing within the
Bedouin sector. For instance, statistics showed a significant growth in the number
ofmother and child stations, treatment clinics and medical centres among the Arabs,
while the situation among the Bedouin remained static and even regressed relative
to the significant population growth.67 The end ofmilitary government in December
1966 did not render physicians any more willing to move to the Negev. The medical
services for the Bedouin continued to suffer from a severe shortage of trained
personnel that prevented expansion to meet the needs of a growing population. On
the other hand, the removal of military control did bring about an immediate
improvement in the standard ofliving of the Bedouin and their economic situation.
Indirectly, these changes led to an improvement in their health. A significant number
ofBedouin chose tojoin Kupat Holim and take advantage ofthe services ofprivate
physicians, thanks to their improved finances. As a result, there was a drop in the
number of Bedouin seeking the assistance of the government-supported medical
67A report by the Ministry of Health, stations in service in 1964 in the minority sector,
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64The Health Care ofthe Negev Bedouin, 1948-1966
service, reflecting widespread dissatisfaction of the Bedouin with the quality of free
treatment provided by government-run curative services.
However, while these services received low appraisals, the Bedouin valued and co-
operated with the Ministry ofHealth's preventive medicine apparatus, primarily the
mother and child stations and vaccination programmes. The State Comptroller
found that vaccinations were up to date, despite the lack of health services within
the school system.68 In response to the State Comptroller's evaluation, the Ministry
of Health announced plans to expand preventive medical care for the Bedouin in
1968-69, with a mobile health team and health services in the schools.69
Conclusion
The medical service for the Negev Bedouin Arabs was established with the creation
of the State of Israel. The service was inaugurated with a mobile clinic designed to
provide curative services, but was transformed rapidly into an institutionalized
governmental service engaged in both curative and preventive medicine. The military
government andthe Minorities DepartmentoftheMinistryofHealthjointlygoverned
the service. Assigned a low priority on the national agenda, the service suffered
historically from discrimination and neglect of the special needs of the Bedouin
population. These were exacerbated by practical obstacles, including the problems
of treating a dispersed population living on the periphery, not always in accessible
locations, and an acute shortage of suitable nursing and medical personnel.
Political instability and partisan politics, the physical and social isolation inherent
in the military administration, and the Bedouin's location on the geographical and
political periphery, all prevented the organization of adequate medical services for
them. To these difficulties must be added the economic and security problems facing
Israel in its early years. The limited resources of a country over-extended by war and
mass immigration made it impossible to channel sufficient resources for the needs
of the Bedouin community and grant them the attention they required. Moreover,
lack of experience and the disinclination of the medical community to undertake
responsibility for the needs of the Bedouin took their toll, while the reluctance of
the Bedouin community to accept western medicine also weakened the system.
The introduction of maternal insurance, which encouraged hospital deliveries,
together with mother and child stations, and the "penetration" ofthe Bedouin sector
by Kupat Holim were all positive factors that contributed to an improvement in the
quality of health services provided to the Bedouin. The opening of the Central
68The evaluation of the Comptroller was For many years the health services in schools
based on the clinics' records. Other sources consisted of one practical nurse on a moped, and
mentioned that about 37 per cent of the Bedouin the mobile health team had very limited coverage.
children were not immunized at all and, of those Forman et al., op. cit., note 47 above, pp. 207-16.
that did attend the clinics, only 18 per cent were 69Sayyid al Sane, community health worker,
fully immunized at the end of the year. Lewando- operates the Mobile Unit for Follow Up Care to
Hundt noted that, based on the Ministry of Bedouin Arab patients, run by Kupat Holim,
Health team records, between 70 per cent to 80 based at the Soroka Medical Center. Interview,
per cent of the children were immunized. April 2001, at the Faculty of Health Sciences,
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Hospital for the Negev and the arrangement for free hospitalization of poverty
stricken Bedouin widened the scope of Bedouin medical services and changed the
pattern of use ofhealth services by the Bedouin community.
The Achilles heel ofthe system was the lack ofcomprehensive government policy
and planning. As a result, development of services lagged behind rapid population
growth and those services that existed could notfunction adequately under agrowing
caseload. Between 1948 and 1964, the Bedouin population virtually doubled, while
health services were expanded by only 33 per cent. Despite this, two decades of
preventive medicine succeeded in lowering significantly the incidence of viral in-
fections, reducing mortality rates, and improving the general health ofthe Bedouin.
The institution of military government, entailing restrictions on the movement
of the Bedouin, actually contributed to the effectiveness of preventive medicine
programmes, allowing medical staff to locate and treat stricken areas and prevent
the spread of infectious diseases. When centres of infection became evident, the
military governorwascapable ofmobilizing swift and effective measures to intervene.
On the other hand, he lacked professional training in medicine, a weakness that led
at times to decisions detrimental to the functioning of health services. The military
government helped with the logistics ofproviding medical services, but violated the
civil rights of the inhabitants and prevented their integration into Israeli society.
Thus, most Bedouin were unaware of their right to National Insurance benefits for
thefirsteighteen years oftheir enactment. The interiorandwelfareministries claimed
that these matters lay within the purview of the military government. As a result,
registration ofthe Bedouin ascitizenswasdelayed, andrestrictionsontheirmovement
effectively prevented their access to alternative health services beyond the limited
servicesprovided bythegovernment. Themilitarygovernmentallowedtheauthorities
to register Bedouin lands and formulate a plan for permanent settlement, but did
not take any steps to create even a short-term health policy.
Only with the entrance of Kupat Holim into the Bedouin sector in 1962 were
equitable health services introduced, and only in 1967 did the State Comptroller
address the issue of health services to the Bedouin in his annual report. Even this
was done only as part ofa larger study that did not reflect the true situation among
the Bedouin. It is significant that during twenty years of military rule the Bedouin
were never once consulted in debates in the Knesset concerning their health-related
needs anddesires. Mostdecisionsweretakenadhoc. Improvementswereforthcoming
only after Bedouin sheikhs mobilized the power of the press or put pressure on the
Ministry through the good offices ofBen Assa. Most ofthe press, including socialist
party newspapers, devoted little space to Bedouin issues.
In conclusion, for both objective and subjective reasons and in the absence of a
well formulated public policy, Bedouin health issues were assigned a very lowpriority
on the national agenda. The military government delayed the integration of the
Bedouin into Israeli society, a situation that was detrimental to the development of
health services during the period, and increased the gap between objective needs and
actual services developed. This gap has narrowed with the transition to permanent
settlement in the past three decades and the economic and social changes that have
accompanied this transition.
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